for confrontation and beliefs about the risks of taking part.
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A third contribution of this research is then to embed the somewhat fleeting explanations of emotion into more enduring and stable evaluations of the intergroup context.
To do so, I combine the insights of the appraisal theory of emotions and the large body of conflict research that makes use of some form of intergroup comparison.
7 Specifically, I propose that feelings of intergroup anger are rooted in evaluations about the intergroup distribution of resources in a society and the distributions that ought to exist. I call these evaluations, respectively, group endowments and group entitlements. When group endowments and group entitlements are incongruent, either because the outgroup are enjoying resources to which they are not entitled, or the ingroup getting less than their share, anger is felt toward the outgroup, and large numbers of ingroup members may The data show that perceived violations of group entitlements are strongly linked with feelings of intergroup anger. These, in turn, are associated with more pronounced intentions to take part in another attack on the other group. Anger, moreover, is a 6 Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Lerner and Keltner 2001. 7 Examples of the appraisal model are Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989; Lazarus 1991 ; examples of the intergroup comparisons literature on conflict are Gurr 1970; Horowitz 1985; Runciman 1966; Sidanius and Pratto 1999. 8 Misago et al. 2010. significant mediator of the effect of violations of group entitlement. These effects are robust when controlling for a number of other possible explanations, including realistic conflict with the outgroup, the social influence exerted by peers and community leaders and previous participation in intergroup violence.
The Context of the Study: Anti-Immigrant Violence in South
Africa
Perhaps the most familiar feature of the South African political landscape is the faultline between white and black. 9 As the repression of apartheid began lifting in the early 1990s, however, a new frontier of intergroup tensions began to emerge between black South Africans looking forward to a better life under democracy and immigrants, largely from Zimbabwe and Mozambique, searching for a better life away from the economic hardships of their homelands.
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This antipathy has been most marked in the areas where most African immigrants live, the slums and shantytowns that ring South African cities. Vigilante attacks against
African immigrants occur with disturbing regularity in these "townships," as they are known in South Africa.
11 One such incident of anti-immigrant violence occurred on the evening of May 11th 2008 in Alexandra, a densely populated slum near the heart of Johannesburg.
12 An armed mob in the "Beirut" area of Alexandra went door-to-door searching for foreigners. Anyone who could not pass their test-which was to provide the Zulu word for "elbow"-was beaten. Two were killed that first night.
In contrast to previous incidents, the violence only intensified the following nights.
By the 14th of May, Alexandra was in uproar, with thousands of residents toyi-toying, 12 My brief account of this violence draws heavily on the more detailed discussion in Monson and Arian 2012.
13 The toyi-toyi is a protest dance, often accompanied by singing or chanting, and frequently seen at attacking people believed to be foreign and clashing with police. Over the next few days, anti-immigrant violence, looting, and the destruction of shacks occurred in other shantytowns around Johannesburg. By the following week, the violence had spread to the centre of Johannesburg and parts of Cape Town. Finally, after three weeks, a measure of calm returned, leaving 62 people dead, 670 wounded and 100,000 displaced. 
Intergroup Violence and the Paradox of Participation
Intergroup violence is, first, a form of collective violence because perpetrators number in the dozens, hundreds, or thousands. Second, the targets are chosen largely because of their presumed membership in a group, 16 with the groups of interest being those that are widely believed to be an important social category in a given context, such as ethnic, political rallies and gatherings.
14 Misago et al. 2010 .
15 Misago et al. 2010; Misago 2012 . These "community policing fora", as they are known, emerged as sites of resistance during the struggle against apartheid. In the post-apartheid era, with the police lacking any legitimacy in the townships, the South African government sought to refashion these as sites where the police could interface with the community (Steinberg 2008b) . This had the unintended consequence of handing over authority to whoever was occupying the leadership positions of these structures. 
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A second strand in the literature assumes that groups act in pursuit of some collective goal, with violence resulting when these group preferences collide. Some authors focus on competition over material public goods such as jobs or government housing.
20
These also emerge as important grievances in interview research conducted after the violence in South Africa. 21 Although this approach is often termed "realistic group conflict theory", a similar set of explanations, albeit focusing on symbolic group goals such as status or worth, is also prominent in this literature.
22
Both traditions of research are noticeably silent, however, when it comes to the microlevel mechanisms linking leaders or groups and the participation of thousands of civilians.
23 Even if leaders do stand to benefit from orchestrating communal violence, it 17 This definition of intergroup violence draws on Horowitz 2001, 17-26 ; it distinguishes intergroup violence from rebellions (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and violent protests (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989) , where violence is directed against the state and its representatives, and with ethnic war (Petersen 2002) and genocide (Straus 2006) , where regular or irregular military units conduct most of the fighting. The definition includes lynchings and racial violence (Olzak 1992) , ethnic riots and pogroms (Horowitz 2001) and anti-immigrant violence (Dancygier 2010 is not clear how they get large numbers of participants to do their bidding. Nor is it transparent why individuals should take part in pursuit of some group goal, from which they may or may not benefit. This criticism holds whether this group goal as construed as primarily material or largely symbolic: one may desire a higher status for one's group, but also desire not to be injured or arrested because of an attack on a higher-status group.
Participation in intergroup violence is, moreover, accompanied by significant costs. This paper thus departs from the selective incentive mechanisms that are frequently used to explain participation in conflict and turns, instead, to an emotional mechanism. Emotions have a compulsive quality, 38 and are thus ideal for understanding the aggressive and non-normative behavior of taking part in a mob attack on another group. As I argue in the next section, anger is the emotion that is particular interest because it has a dual effect: it provides both the motivation for aggression and the means by which the risks, dangers, and normative costs of participation are overcome.
The Emotional Pathway to Participation
Emotions have re-emerged as explanations for several political attitudes and behaviours.
Of particular relevance for this study, researchers have previously linked emotions to 35 Note that only one percent of my survey respondents reported that "some" or "many" participants had been paid in 2008. the Balkans, where variables such as the historical relationships between groups and levels of state authority lead to violence via the emotional pathways of "fear", "resentment", "rage" and "hatred". Although Petersen's macrolevel, comparative historical approach does not speak directly to the microlevel question of why some individuals take part and others do not, his theoretical stratagem of using emotion to explain violence, and then linking emotions to more enduring background variables, is one that I adopt here.
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There are thus two parts to my model of participation. The first, like Petersen, uses emotion to explain violence, although, in my case, the violence is at the individual level.
The second part of the model then seeks to establish the roots of emotional reactions.
My theory is about individuals, so these roots are themselves individual attitudes, but are more stable evaluations than emotions. 49 Using data on recognition of facial expressions to categorize emotions, Ekman 1992 comes up with a list of seven: happiness, fear, surprise, anger, distress, disgust and contempt (Ekman 1972 (Ekman , 1992 .
Explaining Participation
Applying cluster analysis to data on 135 emotion words, Shaver and colleagues find six main clusters:
most closely associated with an appraisal that the other party is incompetent, 50 suggesting that if contempt plays a role in intergroup conflict, its influence is limited to contexts where a powerful group encounters an oppressed and downtrodden minority group. This is not the case in the local-immigrant conflict in South Africa, nor is it the case in many examples of intergroup violence where higher status groups are attacked.
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The most plausible emotional determinant of participation in intergroup violence remains anger, particularly intergroup anger. The first hypothesis is thus:
Hypothesis 1. Intergroup anger increases an individual's intention to participate in intergroup violence.
The Roots of Anger
Existing research shows that anger is caused by appraisals that one has been harmed, and that another party is responsible. 52 Anger is particularly likely when that harm is perceived as unjust or illegitimate.
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love, joy, surprise, happiness, anger and fear (Shaver et al. 1987) . Finally, examining the structure and functioning of the brain, Panksepp concludes there are seven innate emotional systems, underpinning the emotions of "fear, anger, sorrow, anticipatory eagerness, play, sexual lust and maternal nurturance" (Panksepp 1998, 47 
Data and Methods
There is something of a tradeoff between internal and external validity in the study of intergroup conflict at the individual level. While the determinants of antipathy and aggression towards outgroups can be tested in experimental studies, research ethics limits the extent to which real groups and samples from violence-prone settings can be used.
Given that experimental tests, using student samples and contrived situations, of the link between intergroup anger and confrontational intentions exist, due to small numbers of observations in the middle two categories. Thirty-five percent of respondents said they would definitely take part in an anti-foreigner protest; 12% said they would definitely assault someone; 15% expressed a firm intention to destroy shacks; while 60% claimed that they would definitely not help any victims.
The latent variable of intention to participate in future violence is estimated using a two-parameter logistic item response theory (IRT) model for ordinal data. This model assumes that the latent variable is unidimensional, an assumption that is confirmed by establishing that only the first eigenvalue of the correlation matrix of items exceeds a value of one. The scale is also reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .87). Parameter estimates of all measurement models are available in the online appendix.
Anger. Anger was measured at three different points in the survey: after short vignettes about foreigners working in Johannesburg and living in government houses in Alexandra, and again after the intergroup endowment and entitlement comparisons (see below). In each of these three situations, respondents were presented with a list of nine emotion words (happy, proud, angry, irritated, jealous, worried, ashamed, disappointed, and no feeling), and asked to choose the words that "best" and "next best" "describe how you feel, as a South African" about the situation just described.
Following previous research, 63 the words "angry" or "irritated" are both taken as indicators of intergroup anger. There are thus six indicator variables: whether the respondent chose "angry" as either the "best" or "next best" description across the three contexts, and whether they did so again using "irritated". A two-parameter logistic IRT conducted in Alexandra by Steinberg 2008a and Misago 2012, convinced me that social desirability issues would not present a major problem when asking people about their participation intentions.
Despite clearly being an outsider to the area, my initial investigations also yielded several individuals who expressed aggressive intentions regarding immigrants. My survey fieldworkers were also quite experienced at asking sensitive questions. Being black South African residents of Johannesburg, they were also part of the ingroup, and quite likely to be trusted by respondents. More generally, Horowitz 2001, 366-373 notes the absence of remorse characterizing communities that perpetrate deadly ethnic riots. 63 Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Tausch et al. 2011 model fit to the set of six measures is used to estimate the latent variable of intergroup anger.
Violations of Group Entitlement. Perceptions of group endowments and group entitlements were obtained using a version of Cantril's scale featuring a ladder with seven "rungs". 64 The lowest rung was marked "1" and described as a low position in society; the highest rung was marked "7" and presented as a high level of endowment or entitlement. Four questions were asked, corresponding to in-and outgroup endowments and entitlements.
The variable measuring violations of group entitlements is calculated by adding the violation of ingroup entitlements (Entitlement in − Endowment in ) to the perceived violation of the outgroup's entitlement (Endowment out − Entitlement out ). Violations of group entitlements, in other words, measures the cumulative number of rungs on the ladder that both the in-and out-groups must move to get from the current distribution of resources between groups to the distributive situation that is desired by the ingroup.
Control Variables. The use of observational data means that it is necessary to consider alternative explanations that may confound any observed relationships among the key variables. First, I control for realistic group conflict by collecting measures of exposure to resource competition with African immigrants. Indicators for being unemployed (which leads to competition for jobs), living in poor quality housing (competition for government housing) and working as an informal trader (competition with foreign traders for customers) are collected. 65 Second, I control for the effects of elite mobilization using a scale measuring the extent to which respondents heard community leaders blaming immigrants for taking locals' jobs or houses, or acting disrespectfully to locals. I also used fixed effects for community policing sector the capture any unobserved heterogeneity due to leaders. Third, to control for social pressure I use two measures. The first is number 64 Cantril 1965 . 
Empirical Strategy
Given that the theory has two components, I will test the hypotheses using two regression equations, one for participation intentions, and the other for anger:
The effects of interest are β 1 and γ. We might also be interested in the mediation effect: the effect of group entitlement violation, on participation intentions, as expressed through the mechanism of anger. This effect can be calculated simply as the product of β 1 and γ, but I will also use the simulation technique of Imai and colleagues to provide an uncertainty estimate. 67 The assumption is that these two equations form a recursive model. In other words, as the theory suggests, the effects flow in one direction from the foundational variable of group entitlement violations to the dependent variable of intended participation. Relaxing this assumption, while desirable, would require some additional information, such as credible instrumental variables (Paxton, Hipp, and Marquart-Pyat 2011) .
68 For the proof of the product rule, see Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010, 313-314. Given that the data were gathered using a complex survey design, I use survey linear regressions, which take account of the unequal probabilities of selection into the sample, as well as the additional uncertainty generated by weighting and two-stage cluster sampling. 69 Missing data were handled using multiple imputation.
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Results and Discussion
Bivariate Results I begin by considering bivariate relationship between emotion and participation intentions, on the one hand, and group evaluations and anger, on the other. higher position for the ingroup is associated with lower levels of anger, a higher outgroup endowment is associated with higher levels of anger. On the normative dimension, the position that is deserved by the ingroup has a positive association with anger, with the opposite effect observed for outgroup entitlements. The next four correlations use scales calculated using different pairs of these four group evaluations. All show positive correlations with anger with deserved inequality (ingroup entitlements − outgroup entitlements) and violations of outgroup entitlements (outgroup entitlement − outgroup endowments) having the strongest relationships. Thus, while theories such as relative deprivation focus on the gap between ingroup endowments and entitlements, it appears that the gap between those outgroup endowments and entitlements is at least as important. Bivariate correlation with intergroup anger
Group evaluations
Each point shows the bivariate correlation coefficient between a group evaluation and intergroup anger. The first four group evaluations are the four survey items: ingroup and outgroup endowments and entitlements. The next four are scales calculated using different pairs of these group evaluations: perceived and deserved inequality between groups, and violations of ingroup and outgroup entitlements. The final group evaluation is violations of group entitlements, which uses all four of the group evaluations. Vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
while many researchers use inequality to explain conflict, far fewer consider the level of inequality that the ingroup thinks is deserved. 73 Finally, the rightmost point in the plot shows the correlation between violations of group entitlement, which uses all four of the basic group evaluations, and intergroup anger. This correlation is the highest of any reported in this figure (.32).
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The bivariate relationships between anger and participation intentions, on the one 73 Sidanius and Pratto 1999 is a notable exception.
74 This correlation is also significantly higher than the correlations for perceived inequality and violations of ingroup entitlement (t = 4.32 and 3.58, respectively), using the t-test for the difference between two dependent correlations.
hand, and group entitlement violations and anger, on the other, are consistent with the hypothesized model. To control for the effects of the potential confounds I identified earlier, I thus turn to the results of the regression models of participation intentions and intergroup anger. These are displayed in Table 1 ; participation intentions is used as the outcome variable in Model 1.1, with intergroup anger the outcome variable in Model 1.2. Table 1 shows that respondents who feel angry at immigrants in Alexandra are indeed significantly more willing to take part in future violence against this outgroup. The effect is substantively large: the standardized regression coefficient for anger is .33. This effect, moreover, controls for various other factors that could conceivably produce both anger and participation intentions. There are five in particular. Anger and willingness to take part in future violence might be thought to be a manifestation of
Model Results
(1) exposure to material competition with the outgroup, (2) the influence of peers, (3) mobilization by leaders, (4) normative support for violence or (5) strength of national identity. The effect of anger is robust to the inclusion of measures of all of these factors.
The regressions also control for background factors like poverty, gender and age, which have also been associated with participation in existing research. 75 The observed relationship between anger and participation intentions thus does not appear to be a spurious correlation produced by the effect of material threat from the outgroup, for example.
However, nor is it likely that the association between anger and participation intentions represents a reversed causal process, where participation intentions causes anger.
Such an effect might be though to occur if anger is a response to past violent behaviour, which the theories of self-perception and cognitive dissonance suggest might be possible
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Controlling for respondents' behaviour in the previous attacks of 2008 does not, however, alter the observed effect of anger, suggesting that the causal arrow points from anger to participation intentions.
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Nor is it very likely that respondents falsely expressed anger during the survey to mask their more venal motives. Three characteristics of the survey suggest that this is unlikely. First, the questions on participation and intentions to participate were asked at the end of the survey, after all the items measuring the independent variables. Second, the anger questions were not posed in the abstract, but were instead asked in reference to fairly detailed vignettes designed to prompt realistic emotional reactions in respondents.
Third, emotions were measured by asking respondents to choose a word from a categorical response set. This was expected to reduce the demand characteristics that might result from using a Likert scale response set for each possible emotional reaction (asking, in other words, how angry or irritated respondents felt). Finally, we can also interpret these findings in terms of mediation. There is a significant indirect effect of group entitlement violations on participation intentions, exerted through the mechanism of anger. 79 Anger, in other words, mediates part of the total effect that violations of group entitlements exert on intentions to take part in intergroup 78 A variety of authors have argued that anger is an evolved response to a violation of normative order, particularly the fundamental norms that regulated the social life of our ancestors in the form of dominance hierarchies (Axelrod 1986; Fessler 2010; Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides 2009) . These dominance hierarchies, moreover, have also been linked with the evolution of deontic or normative reasoning in humans (Cummins 2005) . There is a striking resemblance, finally, between the cognitions required to operate within a society governed by dominance hierarchies and the four evaluations that constitute violations of group entitlement: both require an evaluation of the resources enjoyed by oneself and some other party, as well as an understanding of the resources that are entitled by both parties.
79 There are a number of ways of testing this effect. It can be obtained by taking the product of the two coefficients of interest, β 1 and γ, which gives a value of .21. A Sobel test can be conducted to verify whether this is significant. It is (test statistic = 4.42; standard error = .05; p < .001). Finally, one may use the simulation method of Imai and colleagues (Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010) , which gives essentially the same result: mediation effect = .21; standard error = .05.
violence. Note that anger appears to be a "partial mediator" of group entitlement violations, because this variable also exerts a direct effect on participation intentions, as can be seen in Model 1.2.
Additional Findings
A further concern that one might have with this analysis is the link between participation intentions and actual participation. The measure of participation intentions might consistently under-or over-estimate the probabilities that certain people would take part in future. Some individuals may profess an intention to participate without any real likelihood of doing so. Others might deny any intention to take part in future but are, in fact, likely to be mobilized because of their social networks. In the former case, respondents underestimate the costs of participation; in the latter, they underestimate the situational determinants. To address both of these concerns, interaction terms between anger and participation in the 2008 attacks, on the one hand, and attendance at the community meetings, on the other, are included. The former model permits a consideration of whether anger explains participation intentions among the subsample who participated in 2008, and thus fully understand the costs and dangers of taking part. The latter model verifies whether anger has a diminished effect among the subsample who are embedded in community social networks, and thus more likely to be mobilized by their peers should violence actually recur. Neither of these interaction effects is significant.
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The marginal effects of these interaction terms are then displayed in Figure 3 83 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for suggesting this possibility to me.
84 Results are available in the online appendix.
intentions increases to the extent that the respondent supports violence. A combination of support for violence and anger at the outgroup is thus a particularly dangerous brew.
Note that, however, despite this moderating effect, anger retains a positive marginal effect on aggressive intentions even for those respondents who strongly oppose violence (the lefthand side of Figure 4) . Moreover, this dual effect of support for violence (a direct effect on participation and a moderating effect on anger), has an implication for the broader issue of why intergroup violence occurs at all. As Horowitz observes, the incidence of intergroup violence declined precipitously in the West after the Second World War. 85 The mechanism of anger is itself insufficient to explain this dynamic societal-level variation, because anger is a fairly "hard-wired" reaction to groups that may occur in any setting-educated, 85 Horowitz 2001, 560-5. industrialized, developed or not. Instead, Horowitz's suggested explanation for the empirical puzzle is "a growing aversion to mass violence" in the West after the War. This conjecture is a historical claim, but its psychological underpinnings find support in my data from Alexandra: anger appears to have an increasingly aggressive effect to the extent that violence is viewed as legitimate. If citizens of Western countries did indeed become largely averse to violence in the latter half of the 20th century, then the mobilizing effects of intergroup anger would have been undercut.
Conclusion
As hypothesized, feeling angry at another group proves to be an important explanation for why ordinary people are willing to take part in collective violence against that group. This It bears repeating that this paper focuses on one part of the larger problem of why intergroup violence occurs-the puzzle of why ordinary people join in an attack on another group. In addition to a supply of willing participants, the occurrence of an episode of intergroup violence also requires some focal point or collective event where passions can spill over into violence. 
